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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-2205 
___________ 
 
GREGORY BROWN, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CLINICAL DIRECTOR ELLEN MACE-LIEBSON;  
ASSOCIATE WARDEN CYNTHIA ENTZEL 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3-14-cv-00623) 
District Judge:  Honorable Malachy E. Mannion 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 8, 2019 
Before:  MCKEE, COWEN and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 9, 2019) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Gregory Brown, a federal prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis, 
appeals from the District Court’s order entering summary judgment against him.  Brown 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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also appeals from several other orders that the District Court entered during the course of 
the litigation.  For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm. 
I. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, we will recite only the facts necessary 
for our discussion.  In June 2013, Brown injured his back while lifting weights at FCI-
Schuylkill, where he was incarcerated.  Since then, Brown has experienced severe pain, 
numbness, and swelling in his back, hip, knee, shin, and foot.  On July 2, 2013, Brown 
was examined by Physician’s Assistant (“PA”) Lingenfelter, who prescribed pain 
medication and the use of a muscle rub.  About a week later, Brown was examined by PA 
Rush, who noted a possible lumbar strain and recommended stretching and rest for four 
to six weeks.  On July 19, 2013, Brown was examined during sick call.  He asked to be 
evaluated by a physician and to have an MRI scheduled.  On July 23, Brown was again 
examined by PA Rush, who provided pain medication and ordered an X-ray of Brown’s 
spine.   
On July 29, 2013, Brown submitted an inmate request to the defendants, Clinical 
Director Ellen Mace-Liebson and Associate Warden Cynthia Entzel.  Brown requested to 
be examined by a physician, but Dr. Mace-Liebson responded that Brown had to first 
complete the course of evaluation with his assigned providers.  In August 2013, Brown 
approached Entzel on multiple occasions to discuss his medical care.  Entzel responded 
that she had emailed Dr. Mace-Liebson and that she was looking into the issue, but that 
Dr. Mace-Liebson was away at the moment. 
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On August 16, 2013, PA Rush examined Brown, ordered an X-ray of Brown’s 
knee, and discussed possible treatment options, including the use of oral steroids, until 
Brown could be evaluated by Dr. Mace-Liebson.  On September 3, 2013, Brown was 
scheduled to see Dr. Mace-Liebson, but she was not at work that day.  On September 17, 
2013, Brown was examined by Dr. Mace-Liebson.  She informed Brown that an MRI 
was not clinically indicated and that Brown should continue with conservative treatments 
such as rest and stretching.   
In October 2013, Brown sent another inmate request to Dr. Mace-Liebson.  Brown 
restated his medical issues and requested an MRI.  Dr. Mace-Liebson responded that 
Brown’s concerns should be handled through his sick call provider, who would refer him 
to a physician if necessary.  In December 2013, Brown sent an inmate request to Entzel.  
Brown requested an MRI and wrote that he believed that Dr. Mace-Liebson may have 
been retaliating against him for filing grievances about his medical care.  Entzel 
responded that, based on Dr. Mace-Liebson’s medical examination and expertise, an MRI 
was not indicated at that time. 
On January 14, 2014, Brown was again examined by Dr. Mace-Liebson.  She told 
Brown that an MRI was still not clinically indicated.  That was Brown’s last examination 
by Dr. Mace-Liebson, as he was transferred from FCI-Schuylkill to FCI-Edgefield on 
August 25, 2014.  Before his transfer, Brown was examined by other FCI-Schuylkill 
medical staff on February 6, 2014, and on July 15, 2014.  Brown was again 
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recommended conservative treatments, including rest, weight loss, and stretching 
exercises. 
In February 2015, after his transfer and while incarcerated at FCI-Edgefield, 
Brown had his first MRI.  Based on that MRI, doctors treating Brown determined that his 
back was stable and that surgery was not recommended.  They provided Brown with 
epidural steroid injections, which Brown acknowledges were similar to the oral steroids 
that he was offered at FCI-Schuylkill.  Brown had a second MRI in February 2016.  In 
September 2016, an orthopedic surgeon determined that Brown’s symptoms were not 
improving from the course of conservative treatment, and that surgery might be indicated.  
Brown had a third MRI and a consult with the West Virginia University Department of 
Neurosurgery in early 2017.  No surgery was scheduled or recommended at that time. 
In April 2014, before he was transferred from FCI-Schuylkill, Brown filed a 
complaint in the District Court against Entzel and Dr. Mace-Liebson, raising Eighth 
Amendment claims pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 
U.S. 388 (1971).  The District Court dismissed the claims against Entzel but permitted 
the claims against Dr. Mace-Liebson to proceed.  Brown then filed an array of discovery 
motions, as well as a motion to recuse the District Judge, a motion to appoint an expert, 
and several motions for appointment of counsel. 
In a thorough opinion addressing Brown’s discovery motions, the District Court 
reviewed the written discovery in this case.  The District Court determined that Dr. Mace-
Liebson provided adequate responses to all 25 interrogatories that had been properly 
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served by Brown, and that Dr. Mace-Liebson provided adequate responses to most, but 
not all, of Brown’s document requests.  Thus, the District Court granted Brown’s motion 
to compel, in part, and ordered Dr. Mace-Liebson to provide further responses regarding 
her work schedule and any grievances that resulted in discipline against her.  The District 
Court denied, without prejudice, Brown’s motion to conduct depositions, as he failed to 
identify a deposition officer pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 30 and 31.  The 
District Court denied Brown’s motion for recusal based on the District Judge’s prior 
service as an Assistant United States Attorney.  The District Court also denied Brown’s 
motions for appointment of counsel. 
In September 2017, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. 
Mace-Liebson.  Brown then filed a motion for reconsideration, which he supplemented 
with evidence showing that he had recently been scheduled for back surgery.  The 
District Court denied the motion for reconsideration in May 2018.  This appeal ensued. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We review district court decisions 
regarding both summary judgment and dismissal for failure to state a claim under the 
same de novo standard of review.”  Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 826 
(3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  Summary judgment is proper where, 
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viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 
422–23 (3d Cir. 2006).  “We generally review the District Court’s denial of 
reconsideration for abuse of discretion.  However, to the extent that the denial of 
reconsideration is predicated on an issue of law, such an issue is reviewed de novo; to the 
extent that the District Court’s disposition of the reconsideration motion is based upon a 
factual finding, it is reviewed for clear error.”  Max’s Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. 
v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).  We may affirm on 
any basis supported by the record.  See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 
2011) (per curiam). 
III.    
To succeed on an Eighth Amendment medical needs claim, “a plaintiff must make 
(1) a subjective showing that ‘the defendants were deliberately indifferent to [his or her] 
medical needs’ and (2) an objective showing that ‘those needs were serious.’”  Pearson v. 
Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)).1  Prison officials can “act 
deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs by ‘intentionally denying or 
                                              
1 The parties do not dispute that Brown’s medical needs were serious.  See Atkinson v. 
Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 266 (3d Cir. 2003) (“this Court has defined a medical need as 
serious if it has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment”).   
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delaying access to medical care or interfering with the treatment once prescribed.’”  Id. 
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976)).  But “mere disagreement as to 
the proper medical treatment” is insufficient to support an Eighth Amendment claim.  
Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987).  Thus, 
“when medical care is provided, we presume that the treatment of a prisoner is proper 
absent evidence that it violates professional standards of care.”  Pearson, 850 F.3d at 535 
(citing Brown v. Borough of Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[I]t is 
well established that as long as a physician exercises professional judgment his behavior 
will not violate a prisoner’s constitutional rights.”)). 
Here, the District Court’s dismissal of the claims against Entzel was proper.  A 
non-medical prison official is not charged with deliberate indifference for withholding 
adequate medical care from a prisoner being treated by medical personnel “absent a 
reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are 
mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner.”  Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 
2004).  Although Brown alleged that he filed grievances with Entzel and complained to 
her regarding his request for an MRI, Brown also alleged that Entzel reviewed the issue 
and deferred to the medical staff’s professional judgment.  Brown failed to allege that 
Entzel, operating in her supervisory capacity as the Associate Warden, had any reason to 
believe that the prison doctors or their assistants were mistreating Brown.2 
                                              
2 The District Court did not err in denying leave to amend.  See Grayson v. Mayview 
State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).  Brown has waived any argument that his 
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We also agree with the District Court’s determination that Dr. Mace-Liebson was 
entitled to summary judgment because Brown produced no evidence that would support a 
finding that she acted with deliberate indifference.  The undisputed facts show that Dr. 
Mace-Liebson consistently exercised her professional judgment during the course of 
Brown’s treatment at FCI-Schuylkill in 2013 and 2014.  Brown’s core arguments—that 
Dr. Mace-Liebson should have provided him an MRI or surgery sooner—constitute 
“mere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment.”  Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346.  The 
facts in the record regarding Brown’s treatment at FCI-Schuylkill and after he left FCI-
Schuylkill do not suggest that Mace-Liebson delayed or denied any treatment for non-
medical reasons, or that she otherwise exposed Brown to undue suffering, as other 
physicians pursued a similar course of conservative treatment for years after Brown left 
Dr. Mace-Liebson’s care.  Nor did Brown marshal any evidence showing that Dr. Mace-
Liebson “so deviated from professional standards of care that it amounted to deliberate 
indifference.”  Pearson, 850 F.3d at 541 (quotation marks and citation omitted).3 
                                              
complaint raised a retaliation claim under the First Amendment.  United States v. Pelullo, 
399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (issues not raised on appeal are waived). 
3 The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying: (1) Brown’s motion for leave 
to file a sur-reply in opposition to the motion for summary judgment; or (2) Brown’s 
motion to strike two declarations filed in support of Dr. Mace-Liebson’s motion for 
summary judgment.  See generally Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 252 F.3d 
267, 276 (3d Cir. 2001); In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 
1982).  Brown did not show that his proposed sur-reply would have raised any new 
evidence or meritorious argument, nor did he establish any grounds to strike the 
declarations. 
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The District Court properly denied Brown’s motion for reconsideration of the 
District Court’s order granting summary judgment to Mace-Liebson, as Brown failed to 
establish “at least one of the following grounds: (1) an intervening change in the 
controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when the court 
granted the motion for summary judgment; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law 
or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.”  Max’s Seafood Cafe, 176 F.3d at 677.  While 
Brown sought to present new evidence regarding his planned surgery, in order to secure 
relief, Brown had to show that the evidence “(1) [was] material and not merely 
cumulative, (2) could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence and (3) would probably have changed the outcome” of the District 
Court’s decision.  Coregis Ins. Co. v. Baratta & Fenerty, Ltd., 264 F.3d 302, 309–10 (3d 
Cir. 2001).   
Ultimately, Brown failed to show that the new evidence was material and that it 
would have changed the outcome of the District Court’s decision.  The fact that 
physicians recommended surgery4 in late 2017—several years after Brown left Dr. Mace-
Liebson’s care—is insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding Dr. 
                                              
4 On appeal, Brown asserts that he had surgery in 2018.  Brown has not filed a motion to 
supplement the record on appeal, but even if he had, that evidence would not change our 
analysis.  See generally Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 435 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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Mace-Liebson’s deliberate indifference.  Thus, the District Court properly denied the 
motion for reconsideration.5 
IV. 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on the remaining issues 
that Brown has challenged on appeal, including, first, Brown’s motion for recusal.  See 
United States v. Di Pasquale, 864 F.2d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 1988).  Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 455(b)(3), a judge must disqualify himself “[w]here he has served in governmental 
employment and in such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness 
concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular 
case in controversy.”   With regard to a judge who formerly served in the United States 
Attorney’s Office, we have stated that, “absent a specific showing that that judge was 
previously involved with a case while in the U.S. Attorney’s office that he or she is later 
assigned to preside over as a judge, § 455(b)(3) does not mandate recusal.”  Di Pasquale, 
864 F.2d at 279 (emphasis in original).  Brown has offered no evidence indicating the 
District Judge’s involvement with Brown’s case during the Judge’s employment as an 
Assistant United States Attorney over twenty years ago.  Nor did Brown establish that a 
reasonable person would conclude that the District Judge’s impartiality might be 
                                              
5 Brown also argued that the District Court’s denial of Dr. Mace-Liebson’s motion to 
dismiss was the “law of the case” and prevented a grant of summary judgment in her 
favor.  That argument is meritless.  See United States ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech Inc., 
855 F.3d 481, 493 (3d Cir. 2017). 
11 
 
questioned based on his prior employment as an Assistant United States Attorney.  See 
generally Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). 
Second, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Brown’s motions 
for appointment of counsel.  See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 158 (3d Cir. 1993).  The 
District Court identified the appropriate considerations and properly concluded that it was 
unnecessary to appoint counsel, as Brown had been adeptly litigating his case.  See id. at 
155–58. 
Finally, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in making its discovery 
rulings.  See Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 281 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(“We review a district court’s discovery orders for abuse of discretion, and will not 
disturb such an order absent a showing of actual and substantial prejudice.”).  The 
District Court thoroughly considered the various discovery issues and properly granted 
Brown’s motion to compel in part.6  The District Court’s denial of Brown’s motion to 
take depositions was also proper, as Brown failed to identify, or pay the costs for, a 
deposition officer.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 31, 32.  Brown was not entitled to take depositions 
or to retain an expert at the government’s expense.  See Tabron, 6 F.3d at 158–59.  
                                              
6 The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Brown’s subsequent motion to 
compel and for sanctions.  Dr. Mace-Liebson complied with the District Court’s order 
granting the original motion to compel, as she produced additional documents, including 
her time sheets, and she provided a response that no grievances against her have ever 
been substantiated. 
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Brown has not shown that he was denied any discovery that could have advanced his 
claims.  See Anderson, 621 F.3d at 281. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.7 
                                              
7 Brown’s “Motion to Schedule Case for Disposition” is denied as unnecessary.  As the 
Appellees have not filed a brief, we decide this appeal without considering any briefing 
from them. 
